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Abstract: Private efforts to prevent and control biological pests and infectious diseases can be 
a public good, and so incentivizing private biosecurity management actions is both desirable 
and problematic. Compensation contracts can encourage biosecurity efforts, provide support 
against the collapse of economic sectors, and create an insurance network. We conceptualise a 
novel biosecurity instrument relying on formal compensation private-public partnerships using 
contract theory. Our framework explains how the public sector can harness increased private 
biosecurity measures by making payments to agents which depend both on their performance 
and that of the other stakeholders. Doing so allows the government to spread the risk across 
signatory agents. The framework also improves our understanding of government involvement 
due to public effects of biosecurity, influenced by the private agents’ capacity to derive private 
benefit from their own efforts on monitoring and control. Lastly, these theoretical results 
provide a foundation for further study of contractual responsibility sharing for pest 
management. 
Key words: risk sharing, public-private partnerships, contract theory, plant and tree health, 
compensation payments 
JEL Classifications: Q18, Q10, Q58 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The number of plant and animal disease and pest outbreaks is increasing rapidly as a 
consequence of globalization of trade and travel. Developing efficient management plans for 
prevention and control is of key importance to avoid economic, environmental and human 
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health impacts (e.g. Bebber et al., 2014; Donovan 2013; Simberloff, 2012; Dalmazzone and 
Giaccaria, 2014). However, designing and implementing reliable biosecurity policies is a 
difficult challenge, and this has led to an increasing literature on the subject in the last decade 
(for a review see Horan and Lupi, 2010; Keller et al., 2011; Epanchin-Niell, 2017; Lodge et al. 
2016). 
 
In economic terminology, policies to manage pests have public good characteristics (Perrings 
et al., 2002; Perrings 2005). In particular, biosecurity efforts are an impure public good, 
meaning that agents benefit from their own biosecurity efforts as well as those of others 
(Sandler and Arce, 2002), making it challenging to encourage private biosecurity efforts. The 
difficulty in management arises because agents have incentives to invest in their own direct 
benefits but not to take into consideration the contribution to the others (Perrings, 2016). In 
addition, pest management is influenced by many heterogeneous public and private actors, 
including farmers, land owners, managers, agribusiness, conservation agencies and local 
management authorities. Each stakeholder has different preferences for management practices 
and acceptable risks of outbreaks (e.g. García-Llorente, 2008; Mills et al., 2011; Humair et al., 
2014; Reed and Curzon, 2015). Agreeing a set of actions towards the control of an outbreak 
with such heterogeneity of agents is challenging (e.g. Liu et al., 2012; Marzano et al., 2015) 
and often results in delayed responses and poorly coordinated policies due to incentives to free 
ride on the control efforts of others (Mumford, 2011; Cook et al. 2010). 
 
Economic factors justifying government intervention in pest management include public good 
characteristics, coordination challenges, and information failures, as well as other national 
interests such as income distribution or industry resilience (Ramsay, Philip and Riethnuller, 
1999; Perrings et al., 2002; Epanchin-Niell, 2017). The government has a series of instruments 
available, including providing economic incentives (i.e. subsidies or taxes), command and 
control policies (i.e. bans or fines), and also voluntary measures (i.e. codes of conduct). 
However, a framework for biosecurity needs to be carefully designed to promote private efforts, 
cooperative behaviour, and risk sharing (OECD, 2011). To establish a successful ex ante 
mechanism to improve plant health it is crucial that agents receive clear signals on who must 





We focus on the use of private-public partnerships (PPPs) for pest management, in which both 
the government and industry partners agree on a common management strategy. Even though 
there is large a variety of biosecurity agreements, from full government support (such as the 
management of Canadian Beavers in Argentina (GEF project 2012-2016)) to industry based 
schemes (such as the Dutch Potatopol Scheme (Potatopol 2010)), this paper is motivated by 
cost and responsibility sharing schemes. Cost and responsibility sharing agreements are 
relatively new policies which divide the obligations for action and damage control between the 
public and private sector through a predetermined agreed level, while encouraging investment 
in biosecurity measures. They have recently been applied in a plant and animal health context 
in Australia2 (Plant Health Australia, 2014; Animal Health Australia, 2016).  
 
It has been argued that PPPs for biosecurity encourage a consistent and coordinated 
management approach that can reduce costs in the long run, achieving economies of scale and 
developing combined strategies that otherwise would not be possible (Mumford, 2011; Cook 
et al., 2010; Krauss and Duffy, 2010; Waage et al., 2005; Mumford, 2002). PPPs have the 
potential additional benefit of being a pre-agreed policy before an outbreak occurs, thereby 
reducing the response time and minimizing the size and impact of the incursion (Leung et al., 
2004; Heikkila and Peltola, 2004; Kaiser and Burnett, 2010; Sims and Finnoff, 2013). 
Moreover, cooperation between government and the private sector has been shown to be 
essential to ensure a quick control and eradication of outbreaks (van Asseldonk and Bergevoet, 
2014).  
 
The development of these partnerships involves deciding how to split both the costs and 
responsibilities between the state and private partners. We concentrate on responsibility-
sharing, due to its importance in establishing statutory responsibility among a set of 
stakeholders to develop coordinated actions to prevent and control an outbreak. We focus on a 
general case when, due to the heterogeneity of stakeholder interests and the significant social 
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character of the potential impacts on ecosystem services and human health (e.g. Donovan et al., 
2013), an agreement is reached by placing the cost contribution on the government side (Waage 
et al., 2007). This situation is particularly common in plant pests since their effects may be less 
immediate and visible but may have more profound impacts on the landscape in the long term 
(Waage and Mumford, 2008; Wilkinson et al., 2001). Due to these challenges, compensation 
for breaches in plant health is much less common (Mumford, 2001). While this study is 
motivated by a desire to control plant pests, the model and its implications may also generalize 
to certain animal pests.  
 
Our goal is to understand whether and how contracts offering contingent compensation 
payments from the government can spread the risks of an outbreak across signatory agents. We 
develop a contract theory model of two private agents, for example farmers or land owners, 
conducting biosecurity efforts while receiving compensation payments for their actions. Given 
the impure public good character of agents’ biosecurity actions (Reeling and Horan, 2017) we 
also explore the implications on the level of payments when agents can partly appropriate the 
benefits from their own biosecurity efforts. 
 
We focus on plant health as a proxy measure for the level of pest or disease infestation in crops 
and trees. Plant health outcomes, however, depend on other factors than the biosecurity 
measures of the agents. We include an external independent random shock representing 
uncontrollable factors that affect the damages caused by the pest, such as the effect of weather 
on pathogen spread and life-cycle (Whittaker et al., 2001; Guernier et al., 2004) or the impact 
of different management practices throughout the supply chain (Dehnen-Schmutz et al., 2010; 
Hulme et al., 2018). We allow for neighbourhood effects via a correlation parameter.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the components of the theoretical 
framework. Results are developed in Section 3. The analytical results are complemented with 
numerical simulations in Section 4 to further explore the importance of the agent’s capacity to 
derive private benefit from his own biosecurity efforts (public goods vs. impure public goods) 
on payments and overall plant health achieved by the scheme. The theoretical findings are 




2. THE PPP COMPENSATION MODEL 
 
The development of a PPP to create a system of contingent payments for biosecurity efforts can 
be modelled as a contract theory problem: statutory responsibility for pest management is 
assigned to the private agents and, in exchange, they receive compensation from the 
government (the principal). We expand the traditional principal-agent model to account for two 
agents who receive funds based on the health of both of their resources, similar to the model by 
Itoh (1991) and the later adaptation by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). 
 
Principal-agent models deal with the challenges that arise under incomplete and asymmetric 
information, when a principal delegates work to an agent. In a plant biosecurity scenario, these 
conflicting interests appear between the government, which cares about public benefits, and the 
private agents, who are concerned about net economic benefits. Public benefits include 
avoiding threats to food production, preventing the collapse of agricultural or ornamental 
sectors due to extensive pest damages, avoiding the destruction of large areas of woodlands, 
planted forests or urban parks which could impact vital forest ecosystem functions such as air 
quality regulation, cause severe indirect economic losses on property values, affect recreational 
opportunities, and reduce human health and well-being (e.g. Pennisi 2010; Kovacs et al., 2011; 
Jones 2016; Kondo et al., 2017).  
 
However, the government often cannot easily verify that the private agents have behaved 
appropriately (Eisenhardt, 1989). Compensation payments are modelled here to be contingent 
on the final quality of health of the plant or crops, rather than the actual private costs and 
measures in biosecurity efforts. Experience with payments for ecosystem services shows that 
results-based payments are more appropriate when it is less costly to monitor outcomes rather 
than efforts and when there is higher uncertainty on the effectives of efforts to achieve the 
outcome  (White and Hanley 2016; Engel, 2016; Börner et al., 2017). An additional benefit of 
adopting outcome-based compensation is that such schemes have been shown to be effective in 
encouraging agents to use private information to generate outputs, in comparison to payments 
for actions (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Hanley et al., 2012; White and Hanley, 2016). 
Moreover, compensating for outcomes may also decrease the risk for moral hazard (Börner et 
al., 2017). However, we note that that some biosecurity PPPs, such as Recognized Biosecurity 
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Groups in Western Australia, have compensation programmes set up in a different format: there 
a dollar-for-dollar arrangement whereby government contributions are determined by the 
amount of effort invested by private providers (this option received more support from 
landholders throughout a consultation process3; Recognised Biosecurity Groups, 2017). 
 
Public-private contractual schemes need to satisfy both participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints.  The participation constraint requires that the agent must be at least 
as well off by contracting as he would be on his own. The incentive compatibility constraint 
ensures that the agent is behaving according to his own incentives, since an agent’s biosecurity 
efforts are not directly observable by the government, and yet is encouraged to adopt an optimal 
level of biosecurity. The components of the model are described below.  
 
2.1. THE AGENTS 
We consider two independent, identical, and representative agents, labelled by subscripts 1 and 
2, each in charge of producing healthy plants by conducting biosecurity efforts, 𝑎𝑖, such as 
sanitation felling or usage of pesticides and fungicides. However, plant health is also subject to 
external uncontrollable random factors described by a random shock  𝜉𝑖. Moreover we allow 
for neighbouring effects through the inclusion of a correlation parameter 𝛼 : if 𝛼 ≠ 0 then the 
health state of the plants of an agent not only depends on his investment in biosecurity efforts 
and his random external effects, but also on the external factors affecting the other agent. The 
concept of “neighbouring effects” is not limited to spatially adjacent agents, and could 
encompass more general geographic or socioeconomic interconnections. We represent the 
health quality  𝑞𝑖 of agent i’s plants and trees as follows, measured in monetary units: 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝛼 𝜉𝑗               (1)     
 
For simplicity, we assume that each 𝜉𝑖~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2) i.e. they are independently and normally 
distributed external effects, and we note that these local random effects may be beneficial or 
detrimental in any given year.  
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There are, of course, other possible ways to formulate the problem which would depend on the 
details of the outbreaks and control measures, for example having the neighbouring spillover 
effect depend on the plant health of the neighbouring farm4. The independent nature of the 
random factor, as specified in Equation 1, captures the complexity and unpredictability of 
ecological and climatic effects on plant health. 
 
The government compensates each agent for the health quality of their plants with a payment 
of wi. We assume that an agent is able to retain part of the benefits derived from producing 
healthy plants and trees, so that private agents are capable of appropriating part of their own 
biosecurity benefits. Agents are risk averse on profits and we further assume that they have an 
exponential utility5 which depends on the cost 𝜙𝑖(𝑎𝑖) of their chosen level of biosecurity 
efforts, the compensations they receive, and their capacity to appropriate biosecurity benefits. 
This allows the utility for agent i receiving payment wi for biosecurity efforts ai to be written 
as follows: 𝑢𝑖(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = −𝑒−𝜂𝑖[𝑤𝑖+𝛿𝑖 𝑞𝑖 −𝜙𝑖(𝑎𝑖)]        (2)  
 
where the coefficient 𝜂𝑖 represents the degree of risk aversion, and 𝛿𝑖 is the coefficient of 
appropriation of private biosecurity benefits. Finally, we assume that the costs of control are 
quadratically related to the surveillance and control levels applied: 
 𝜙𝑖(𝑎𝑖) = 12 𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑖2          (3)  
                                               
4 For example, an alternative formulation is 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝛼𝑞𝑗 , which captures a stronger interaction between 
the agents’ plant health outcomes. This does not affect the main qualitative results, which become 
 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖+𝛿𝑖+𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑖(1−𝛼2) ;  𝑣1 =  − 𝛿𝑖+1(𝛼2−1)(𝑐𝑖𝜂𝑖𝜎2+1) − 𝛿𝑖   ;  ℎ1 =   𝛼(𝛿+1)(𝛼2−1)(𝑐𝑖𝜂𝑖𝜎2+1) 
 
We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative specification.   
5 Exponential utility was chosen because it has constant absolute risk aversion and it is possible to capture all the 
relevant information about an agent’s risk preferences with a single parameter, the coefficient of risk aversion. 
Moreover, the exponential utility form allows analytical solutions. These benefits make it a commonly used 
functional form and it is often used in contract theory (for example Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). The main 




were 𝑐𝑖 are the marginal costs incurred by the agents for their biosecurity efforts. 
 
2.2. THE GOVERNMENT  
We assume that the government is willing to take more risks than the producers, and is risk 
neutral. We can express the utility of the government measured in monetary units as: 
 
𝑈 = 𝔼 [∑(𝑞𝑖2𝑖=1 −𝑤𝑖)]             (4)  
 
2.3. THE PAYMENTS 
Following contract theory, models of performance based payments typically consist of two 
parts: a fixed payment and a variable incentive payment (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). To 
model agreement formation, we assume that the payments not only depend on the agent’s own 
output, but also on the neighbouring agent’s health state, so compensation payments depend on 
all the agents' actions (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). The government’s linear incentive 
scheme is: 
 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑞𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑞𝑗                (5)  
 
where 𝑧𝑖 is a fixed compensation amount to each of the agents, 𝑣𝑖  is the marginal compensation 
depending on their health state, and ℎ𝑖  is the marginal compensation from the neighbour’s plant 
health, which could encourage mutual agreements between the agents. If the payments from 
the government are not dependent on the performance of the other agent, then  ℎ𝑖𝑞𝑗 = 0.  
 
2.4. THE GOVERNMENT’S MANAGEMENT PROBLEM 
First, the government offers the agents an opportunity to join the partnership. Agents that agree 
to contract with the government then decide their optimal investment in biosecurity to maximize 
their own expected utility. Uncontrollable effects then occur that affect plant health and the 
occurrence of pest damages. Plant health quality is realized by both agents and the government, 














If we assume symmetry, so that both agents are equal in costs, risk aversion, and private benefit 
appropriation capacity, then the problem is simplified and solves for only one optimal scheme {𝑎𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖}. Thus, the government maximizes its expected utility in relation to agent 1 by solving:  max{𝑎1,𝑧1,𝑣1,𝑢1} 𝔼[𝑞1 − 𝑤1]           (6)  
subject to:             𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑤1+𝛿1 𝑞1 −𝜙1(𝑎1)]] ≥ 𝑢(?̅?)        (7)  and                  𝑎1  ∈ arg max{𝑎} 𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑤1+𝛿1 𝑞1 −𝜙1(𝑎1)]]        (8)  
 
That is, the government maximizes expected utility subject to the participation (eq. 7) and 
incentive compatibility constraints (eq. 8) of the representative agent. 𝑢(?̅?) represents the 
utility of wealth associated with the option of not participating in the scheme. Without loss of 
generality, we set   𝑢(?̅?) = 0. 
 
The problem can be transformed into an unconstrained optimization problem6. The first step is 
to solve the agent’s maximization problem (the incentive compatibility constraint) to obtain the 
agent’s optimal biosecurity efforts, 𝑎1, taking payments as given. Using the properties of the 
lognormal distribution and after some algebra, each agent’s utility maximization problem 
becomes: 
 
                                               












plant health  





biosecurity External effects occur 
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max{𝑎1}  { 𝑧1 + 𝑣1𝑎1 + ℎ1𝑎2 + 𝛿1𝑎1 − 12 𝑐1𝑎12 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿1)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿1𝛼)2]}   (9) 
 
The agent’s optimal biosecurity efforts are given by the first order condition:  
  𝑎1 = 𝑣1 + 𝛿1𝑐1      (10)  
 
Thus, the agent’s own optimal biosecurity efforts are determined by the ratio of the marginal 
payment and capacity of appropriation of public benefits, to the marginal costs of biosecurity 
efforts.  
 
The government’s problem can be represented by substituting the first order condition from the 
agent’s optimization problem and the participation constraint into the objective function of the 
government (eq. 6) transforming the problem of the government to:  
 
max{  ,𝑣1,𝑢1} (𝑣1 + 𝛿1𝑐1 (1 + 𝛿1) − 12 𝑐1 (𝑣1 + 𝛿1𝑐1 )2 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿1)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿1𝛼)2])    (11) 
 
The optimal marginal payments,  ℎ1 and 𝑣1, are derived from the first order conditions of the 
problem of the government. For a given 𝑣1, ℎ1 is determined to minimize the risk (third and 
fourth term of equation 11) and then 𝑣1 is set optimally to trade off risk sharing and incentives: 
 ℎ1 =  − ( 2𝛼(𝛿1 + 1 )1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)             (12)  
 𝑣1 =  (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿1 + 1)1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2 − 𝛿1             (13)  
 
The results for the marginal payments capture the core motivation behind the use of contracts 
for biosecurity efforts: risk sharing. The marginal payment for the neighbour’s plant quality, ℎ1, 
is negative (assuming the correlation is positive, 𝛼 > 0 ), implying that an agent is 
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disadvantaged by the neighbouring agent’s more healthy plants. By introducing payments that 
depend on both agents’ outputs, the government filters the common shocks and thus reduces 
each agent’s exposure to risk.  
 
Moreover, the incapacity of the government to fully observe the biosecurity efforts 
implemented by the agents, and the uncertainty of their outcomes as represented by the external 
random shocks 𝜉𝑖  , causes a distortion in the solution and a first-best solution is not achieved 
(Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). This can be seen in the optimal marginal payments (eq. 12 
and eq.13), in the term 𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2, which captures the frictions of asymmetric 
information between the private agents and the government.  
 
The government uses 𝑧1, the fixed part of the payments, to ensure that the contract is appealing 
to the agents (eq. 14); that is 𝑧1 becomes the residual of the incentive participation constraint 
(eq. 7). The fixed payment is then set so that the private benefits derived by the agent from 
joining the contract are equal to the costs, including the personal costs of conducting biosecurity 
effort as well as the disutility of the contract from the uncertainty of plant health due to the 
agent’s risk aversion: 
 𝑧1 = (12) (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿1 + 1)2(𝛼4𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2 + (−2𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2 − 1)𝛼2 + 4𝛼 + 𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2 − 1)𝑐1(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐1𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)2       (14)  
 
3.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE OPTIMAL PPP SOLUTION 
The expected final health quality of the plants (eq. 15) is given by the optimal level of 
biosecurity efforts employed by the private agents: 
 𝔼[𝑞𝑖] =  (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿𝑖 + 1)𝑐𝑖(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝑖𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)             (15)  
 
Total expected compensating payments from the government to the agent are given by:  




As the agents appropriate higher benefits from the impure public good nature of their 
biosecurity efforts, total expected payments decrease. If 𝛿𝑖 = 1 (i.e. if the public element of 
investing in biosecurity efforts is minimal) then there is no need for the government to create 
positive incentives, so total expected payments are zero. 
 
The expected utility of the government from setting the contracts is given by the expected net 
benefits of plant health quality and the costs of payment compensation: 
 𝔼(𝑞1 − 𝑤1 + 𝑞2 − 𝑤2)  =  (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿𝑖 + 1)2𝑐𝑖(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝑖𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)                   (17)  
 
The expected utility gain (over no contract) of the agents is zero since the government adjusts 
the fixed payment component to just meet the participation constraint thus avoid paying excess 
rent.  
 𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂𝑖[𝑤𝑖+𝛿𝑖 𝑞𝑖 −𝜙𝑖(𝑎𝑖)]]=  𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑎𝑖 − 12 𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑖2− 12 𝜂𝑖𝜎2[(𝑣𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝛼 + 𝛿𝑖)2 + (ℎ𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝛼 + 𝛿𝑖𝛼)2] = 0                                    (18) 
 
3.1. SENSITIVITY TO MODEL PARAMETERS 
The exercise was conducted by looking at effects of a marginal increase in each of the 
parameters on the optimal variables and expected values (eq. 10, 12-17) while keeping all other 
things constant. Throughout this analysis we have assumed that external random effects on 
health quality are positively correlated across agents. The results are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Sensitivity analysis of model parameters on payments, utility, plant health and 
biosecurity efforts. 





Private biosecurity efforts 
𝜕𝑎𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝑎𝑖𝜕𝜂𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝑎𝑖𝜕𝜎2 < 0 
Marginal payment for own quality 
of plant health 
𝜕𝑣𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝑣𝑖𝜕𝜂𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝑣𝑖𝜕𝜎2 < 0 
Marginal payment for neighbour’s 
quality of plant health 
𝜕ℎ𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖 > 0 𝜕ℎ𝑖𝜕𝜂𝑖 > 0 𝜕ℎ𝑖𝜕𝜎2 > 0 
Expected fixed payment 
𝜕𝔼[𝑧𝑖]𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑧𝑖]𝜕𝜂𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑧𝑖]𝜕𝜎2 < 0 
Expected plant health 
𝜕𝔼[𝑞𝑖]𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑞𝑖]𝜕𝜂𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑞𝑖]𝜕𝜎2 < 0 
Expected total payments 
𝜕𝔼[𝑤𝑖]𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑤𝑖]𝜕𝜂𝑖 > 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑤𝑖]𝜕𝜎2 > 0 
Expected government utility 
𝜕𝔼[𝑈]𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑈]𝜕𝜂𝑖 < 0 𝜕𝔼[𝑈]𝜕𝜎2 < 0 
 
Increases in marginal cost decrease the level of biosecurity efforts chosen by the agents, as well 
as the agent’s own marginal payments. The effect on the agent is in part counteracted by an 
increased marginal payment received from the neighbour’s plant health quality. However, total 
expected payments will decrease since, overall, private agents would invest less in biosecurity 
efforts with increased costs. Overall expected plant health and government utility is lower.  
 
As risk aversion increases the agent receives higher compensation for his own plant quality, 
and lower for the neighbour's health outcome. With more risk aversion, agents are less inclined 
to participate in the contract agreement and to invest in biosecurity efforts due to the uncertainty 
in health outcome. Expected plant health is lower. Therefore, total payments need to increase, 
but this comes at the expense of lower government utility. In the extreme case where both agents 
and the government are risk neutral, 𝜂𝑖 = 0, the contract induces first-best biosecurity efforts 
and full compensation, 𝑣𝑖 = 1.  
 
Higher variance of the external random effects lowers biosecurity efforts by the agents, and the 
government decreases the marginal payment for the agent’s own plant health, while the 
marginal payment for the neighbour’s plant health increases. The fixed component of the 
payment is also reduced, but the agent’s total payments increase to compensate for the increase 




3.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE APPROPRIATION OF BENEFITS  
A special case occurs when the government might want to encourage good health, but the agents 
do not derive utility from that improved health state. For example, a land-owner may overlook 
the benefits of preemptive harvesting of a forest parcel in a landscape in response to a potential 
pest outbreak that could spread to a neighbouring forest (Kizlinski et al., 2002). In such a case, 
biosecurity efforts are a case of pure public goods. Assuming that private agents are not 
altruistic, they need monetary incentives to invest in biosecurity to ensure pest free plants and 
trees since benefits to society from healthy plants are not sufficient to justify private biosecurity 
actions. In such a case we can look at the specific scenario when the agent’s income is 
dependent only on the payments and cost of biosecurity levels (𝛿𝑖 = 0).  
 
Under this scenario, optimal biosecurity efforts, marginal payments, and expected values of 
plant health and utility of dealing with impure public goods versus pure public goods are 
summarized in Table 2. To compare both scenarios, we describe the relative change calculated 
as the expected value with impure public goods, minus the case for pure public goods, divided 
by the pure public good case.   
 
Table 2:  Comparison of biosecurity efforts, payments, and utility for the case of impure public 
goods (both private and public appropriation of private biosecurity benefits from healthier 









Biosecurity efforts increase with the 
capacity of private agents to appropriate 
personal benefits. 
Marginal payment 
for own quality of 
plant health 
𝒗𝒊 − 𝜎2𝜂𝛿𝑐(𝛼2 − 1)2𝛼2 + 1 Own marginal payments are lower  
Marginal payment 
for neighbour’s 
quality of plant 
health  
𝒉𝒊 𝛿 Higher payments for neighbour 
contributions are necessary if the agent 
can appropriate part of the benefits 
Expected fixed 
payment 





𝔼[𝒒𝒊] 𝛿 As a result of having private invested 
interests, plant health quality increases.   
Expected total 
payments 
𝔼[𝒘𝒊] −𝛿2 Lower expected total payments to agents 
Expected private 
agent utility  
𝔼[𝑼𝑻𝑰𝑳𝒊] 0 Agent’s utility does not change. 
Expected 
government utility 
𝔼[𝑼] 𝛿2 + 2𝛿 Higher government expected utility, since 
the health outcome is superior and 
payments are lower with appropriation of 
private biosecurity benefits.  
 
 
4.  NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
A numerical simulation illustrates the effects of different levels of appropriation of private 
biosecurity benefits on total payments received by the agent and final plant health quality 
achieved with the PPP scheme. Representative parameter values (Table 3) are given to the 
marginal cost of biosecurity efforts, the degree of risk aversion, and correlation of external 
shocks. Random shocks were simulated 100,000 times, and total expected payments and crop 
health quality were plotted for different levels of private appropriation of biosecurity benefits 
(between 0 and 1). Final expected values were obtained by averaging the results of the 
simulations for each appropriation capacity level.  The mean and 5th and 95th quantiles of 
payments and plant health for each level of appropriation are displayed in Figure 1. This 
exercise was run for three different levels of variance of external effects.  
 
Table 3: Parameter values used in numerical simulation.  
 
The left plot in Figure 1 shows expected payments received by the agent for different levels of 
private appropriation of biosecurity efforts. Under no uncertainty, expected payments never 
exceed 0.5 (representing the shared risk between the government and the agents), and are never 
negative. As the external uncertainty increases, for high values of appropriation, total expected 
Correlation of neighbouring effects 𝛼 0.5 
Mean of normally distributed external effects 𝜇 0 
Variance of normally distributed external effects 𝜎2 0, 0.1, and 0.3 
Marginal costs of biosecurity efforts incurred by the agent 𝑐 1 
Coefficient of risk aversion  𝜂 2 
Coefficient of appropriation of private biosecurity benefits  𝛿 From 0 to 1 
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payments can become negative under some realizations.  In this case of very impure public 
goods, private agents gain larger benefits from their mandated biosecurity efforts, and thus 
compensation payments are not necessary to provide incentives to invest in biosecurity efforts. 
The right plot in Figure 1 shows the effects of appropriation on plant health. With more impure 
biosecurity efforts (higher appropriation of benefits), better plant health is achieved, since 
agents also have private incentives to invest in biosecurity besides receiving government 
compensation payments. While expected payments decrease with appropriation at an increasing 
rate, the plant health increases proportionally. 
Figure 1: Expected payments and plant health for different degrees of private appropiation of biosecurity benefits by agents, and levels of 
variance of external shocks (Simulation mean and 5% and 95% quantiles reported). 
 
5. DISCUSSION: THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF BIOSECURITY PARTNERSHIPS 
 
Our analytical model is intended to identify the key characteristics of cases when the benefits 
of biosecurity have a strong public component, which implies government support to provide 
greater resilience to private agents and industries. Our intention is not to mimic real world 
partnerships, but to provide clarity about the interactions between the government and private 
agents, achieved using a parsimonious and stylized model that captures the most important 
generalizable interactions underlying contractual relationships. Engaging all stakeholders is 
particularly critical in plant health, where the challenges are higher because fewer insurance 
policies or compensation schemes are available and market failures are more prevalent 
(Mumford, 2011). While the role of the government could also be remodelled to fit an industry 
funding scheme (e.g. Barbier and Knowler, 2006; or Fraser, 2016), we instead focus on the 
social desirability of the compensation payment.  
 
We show that, in principle, the risk minimization and risk sharing benefits of PPPs can be 
facilitated through a contract’s coordinated approach. Our analytical model shows that the role 
of payments to encourage biosecurity efforts increases with decreased private appropriation 
capacity of benefits, which is consistent with Reeling and Horan (2015) who show that the 
coordination among agents depends on the relative endogeneity of risk, defined as the level of 
which private agents can take control of their own biosecurity risk.  
 
Our analysis most closely relates to the work of Hennessy and Wolf (2015), who explore how 
information problems and externalities affect biosecurity incentives. However, their analysis is 
specific to livestock diseases and the implications of different externalities on disease 
management. Our emphasis is on engaging all stakeholders in the design of the optimal 
contract, which allows us to build a mechanism of payments that shares the risk among all 
agents. It is also important to note that principal-agent models have also been applied in a 
similar context for payments for ecosystem services (e.g. Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro et al., 2008; 
Hanley et al., 2012; Zabel and Roe, 2009). 
 
However, there are two important caveats to our analysis. Firstly, we only consider complete 
contracts, an approach that has dominated the literature of asymmetric information (Wu, 2014). 
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Our agreed contract directs all conditions of the contract under all contingencies, and is fully 
enforceable, i.e. is completely state contingent, unlike the real world. Thus, we have overlooked 
the role of contract enforcement and inspections of plant health. We refer the reader to other 
literature which explore this issue in detail, for example Gramig et al., (2009) and Jin and 
McCarl (2006). Despite evidence of inspection costs being substantial (for example Surkov et 
al., 2009 and White and Hanley, 2016), new technology such as remote sensing and monitoring 
has the potential to make this process easier and less expensive.   
 
Secondly, the potential emergence of moral hazard behaviour due to compensation (Bremmer 
and Slobbe, 2011) deserves consideration. Future research could explore further the potential 
for minimizing the risks of moral hazards is PPPs with cost and responsibility sharing, where 
the costs of prevention and control are shared between the government and the industry (OECD, 
2011). If these costs are split among all stakeholders, private agents may be less inclined to 
engage in moral hazard.  
 
There is a need for future work to explore how to design a network of PPPs, where crucial 
information is shared and biosecurity efforts are aligned towards an agreed biosecurity 
objective to monitor the broader system being managed. Coordinating such a network of PPPs 
to achieve a broader health quality goal is a major challenge. Of special importance will be the 
nature of the relations among the biosecurity actions carried out in different partnerships (for 
example if they are complementary or substitutes). It is necessary that the scheme works 
towards reinforcing biosecurity-weak industries or areas, and avoids redundant and 




We evaluate analytically the role of private-public contracts as a novel instrument in plant pest 
and disease management, using contract theory. We develop a principal-agent model with the 
public sector and two private agents, where the government makes payments to the agents in 
order to encourage private biosecurity actions while lowering the risk of pest outbreaks. Our 
results show that contracted payments can be designed to spread the economic risk across 
signatories. The framework allows us to understand how the public sector can harness increased 
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private biosecurity measures by making payments to agents which depend both on their 
performance and that of the other stakeholders. Moreover, the optimal level of payment depends 
on the individual agent’s capacity to derive private benefits from healthy plants. When private 
agents can appropriate a large proportion of the benefits, the government is not required to offer 
payments to the agents for their surveillance and control efforts. However, the government 
needs to increase compensation payments if uncertainty increases and when the agents are more 
risk averse. Lastly, while the goal of the paper is not to provide a detailed description of real 
world contracts, the article demonstrates the usefulness of contract theory for conceptualizing 
contracting problems in biosecurity with an aim to encourage further discussions on the use of 
formal contracts to encourage private biosecurity actions.  
 
There is growing interest in contingency plans for plant and animal pests and diseases, 
specifically on policies that encourage risk reduction (Defra, 2014; UK Plant Health Business 
Plan (2006–2008); Food Chain Evaluation Consortium, 2010). There is a need to explore new 
policies capable of encouraging preventive measures, engaging all stakeholders, facilitating 
early response, and minimizing risk. We show that contract theory analysis can provide a basis 
for the understanding of biosecurity roles and responsibilities by public and private agents, the 
gaps between these, and the design of schemes that aim to achieve socially desirable outcomes. 
Our analytical model provides a foundation to stimulate further contributions to apply 
contracting methodology, and to develop empirical tools for testing contract theory to answer 
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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR BIOSECURITY: AN OPPORTUNITY 
FOR RISK SHARING  
Rosa Mato Amboage, Jon Pitchford and Julia Touza 
 
ON-LINE SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
SOLVING THE GOVERNMENT’S PROBLEM 
First we can solve the agent’s maximization problem: 𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑤1+𝛿1 𝑞1  −𝜙1(𝑎1)]] =  𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑧1+𝑣1𝑞1+ℎ1𝑞2+𝛿1 𝑞1 −𝜙1(𝑎1)]]=   𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑧1+𝑣1(𝑎1+𝜉1+𝛼𝜉2)+ℎ1(𝑎2+𝜉2+𝛼𝜉1)+𝛿1 (𝑎1+𝜉1+𝛼𝜉2) −𝜙1(𝑎1)]] 
If we rename  [𝑧1 + 𝑣1(𝑎1 + 𝜉1 + 𝛼𝜉2) + ℎ1(𝑎2 + 𝜉2 + 𝛼𝜉1) + 𝛿1 (𝑎1 + 𝜉1 + 𝛼𝜉2)  − 𝜙1(𝑎1)] = 𝑥, then  
the above expression becomes  𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1(𝑥)]      
By the properties of the lognormal distribution: 𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1(𝑥)] =  −𝑒𝔼[−𝜂1𝑥]+ 12 𝑉𝑎𝑟[−𝜂1𝑥] = −𝑒−𝜂1[𝑧1 + 𝑣1𝑎1+ ℎ1𝑎2 + 𝛿1 𝑎1−  12𝑐𝑎12]+ 1 2 𝜂12𝑉𝑎𝑟 [ 𝑣1𝜉1+𝑣1𝛼𝜉2+ℎ1𝜉2+ℎ1𝛼𝜉1+𝛿𝜉1+𝛿𝛼𝜉2] = −𝑒−𝜂1[𝑧1 + 𝑣1𝑎1+ ℎ1𝑎2 + 𝛿1 𝑎1−  12𝑐𝑎12]+ 1 2 𝜂12𝜎2 [ (𝑣1+ℎ1𝛼+𝛿)2+(ℎ1+𝑣1𝛼+𝛿𝛼)2]     
Due to the properties of the exponential function, solving the above problem is equivalent to 
solving: max{𝑎1}  { 𝑧1 + 𝑣1𝑎1 + ℎ1𝑎2 + 𝛿𝑎1 − 12 𝑐𝑎12 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2]} 
We can now take the first order conditions, and solve for the producer’s chosen level of 
biosecurity efforts, given a set of payments: 
F.O.C: 𝑣1 − 𝑐𝑎1 + 𝛿 = 0 𝑎1 = 𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐  
and by symmetry  𝑎2 = 𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐  
Once we have the optimal solution for the biosecurity level from the producer we can substitute 
it into the participation constraint: 
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𝑧1 + 𝑣1 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + ℎ1 (𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + 𝛿 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) − 12 𝑐 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 )2− 12 𝜂𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2] =  𝑢(?̅?)  
Thus, we can rewrite the public sector’s objective function as: max{𝑎1,𝑧1,𝑣1,ℎ1} 𝔼 [𝑞1 − 𝑤1]  =  max{𝑎1,𝑧1,𝑣1,ℎ1} 𝔼(𝑎1 + 𝜉1 + 𝛼𝜉2 − (𝑧1 + 𝑣1(𝑎1 + 𝜉1 + 𝛼𝜉2) + ℎ1(𝑎2 + 𝜉2+ 𝛼𝜉1)))=  max{ 𝑧1,𝑣1,ℎ1} 𝔼 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝜉1 + 𝛼𝜉2 − (𝑧1 + 𝑣1(𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝜉1 + 𝛼𝜉2)+ ℎ1(𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝜉2 + 𝛼𝜉1))) 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints.  
After taking expectations:  max{ 𝑧1,𝑣1,ℎ1} (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 − (𝑧1 + 𝑣1 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + ℎ1 (𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐 ))) 
subject to   𝑧1 + 𝑣1 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + ℎ1 (𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + 𝛿 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) − 12 𝑐 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 )2− 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (𝑢1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2] =  𝑢(?̅?)  
Because the constraint binds, it is possible to rewrite the problem as an unconstrained 
optimization problem:  
max{  ,𝑣1,ℎ1} (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝑣1 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + ℎ1 (𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + 𝛿 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) − 12 𝑐 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 )2− 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2] − 𝑣1 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 )
− ℎ1 (𝑣2 + 𝛿𝑐 )) 
After some algebra: max{  ,𝑣1,ℎ1} (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 (1 + 𝛿) − 12 𝑐 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 )2 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2]) 
We can now take taking first order conditions with respect to ℎ1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣1 : 
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𝜕𝜕ℎ1  = 12 𝜂1 𝜎2[2(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)𝛼 + 2(ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)] = 0 
Solving for ℎ1: ℎ1 =  − (2𝛼 (𝛿 + 𝑣1 )𝛼2 + 1 ) 
Taking FOC: 𝜕𝜕ℎ1 =  𝛿 + 1𝑐 − 2𝑣1 + 2𝛿2 𝑐 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[2(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿) + 2 𝛼 (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)] = 0  
Solving for 𝑣1 and ℎ1 : 𝑣1 =  (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿 + 1)1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2 − 𝛿 ℎ1 =  − ( 2𝛼(𝛿 + 1 )1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2) 𝑎1 =  (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿 + 1)𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2) 𝑧1 = (12) (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿 + 1)2(𝛼4𝑐𝜂𝜎2 + (−2𝑐𝜂𝜎2 − 1)𝛼2 + 4𝛼 + 𝑐𝜂𝜎2 − 1)𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)2  
 
EXPECTED VALUES 
The expected quality of the crops: 𝔼[𝑞𝑖] =   𝔼 [𝑎𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝛼𝜉𝑗 ] =  (1+𝛼2)(𝛿+1)𝑐(1+𝛼2+𝑐𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1−𝛼2)2)   
Expected total value of payments:  𝔼[𝑤𝑖] =  𝔼[𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑞𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑞𝑗] = zi + 𝑣𝑖 (𝑣𝑖 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + ℎ𝑖 (𝑣𝑗 + 𝛿𝑐 )= −𝛿 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 ) + 12 𝑐 (𝑣1 + 𝛿𝑐 )2+ 12 𝜂𝑖𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2]= −(1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿2 − 1)𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)   
Expected utility of the government: 𝔼(𝑞1 − 𝑤1 + 𝑞2 − 𝑤2) = =  (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛿 + 1)2𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2) 
Expected utility of the producers: 
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𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂𝑖[𝑤𝑖+𝛿𝑖 𝑞𝑖 −𝜙𝑖(𝑎𝑖)]]=  𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑗 + 𝛿𝑎𝑖 − 12 𝑐𝑎𝑖2− 12 𝜂𝑖𝜎2[(𝑣𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝛼 + 𝛿)2 + (ℎ𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝛼 + 𝛿𝛼)2] = 0 
SPECIAL CASE  (𝜹 = 𝟎) 
We can look at the specific scenario when the producer income is only dependent on the 
payments and cost of biosecurity levels (𝛿 = 0).  max{𝑎1,𝑧1,𝑣1,ℎ1} 𝔼(𝑞1 − 𝑤1) 
subject to 
  𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑤1 −𝜙1(𝑎1)]] ≥ 𝑢(?̅?) 
and  
 𝑎1  ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑎} 𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂1[𝑤1 −𝜙1(𝑎1)]] 
 
Under this scenario, the optimal biosecurity effort is 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖𝑐  
The problem of the government becomes max{ 𝑧1,𝑣1,ℎ1} (𝑣1𝑐 − (𝑧1 + 𝑣1 (𝑣1𝑐 ) + ℎ1 (𝑣2𝑐 ))) 
subject to   𝑧1 + 𝑣1 (𝑣1𝑐 ) + ℎ1 (𝑣2𝑐 ) − 12 𝑐 (𝑣1𝑐 )2 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼)2] =  𝑢(?̅?)  
The unconstrained problem becomes: max{  ,𝑣1,ℎ1} (𝑣1𝑐 − 12 𝑐 (𝑣1𝑐 )2 − 12 𝜂1𝜎2[(𝑣1 + ℎ1𝛼)2 + (ℎ1 + 𝑣1𝛼)2]) 
Taking F.O.C for 𝑣1 and ℎ1 and solving for the variables: 𝑣1 =  (1 + 𝛼2)1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2 ℎ1 =  − ( 2𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2) 𝑎1 = (1 + 𝛼2)𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2) 
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𝑧1 = (12) (1 + 𝛼2)(𝛼4𝑐𝜂𝜎2 + (−2𝑐𝜂𝜎2 − 1)𝛼2 + 4𝛼 + 𝑐𝜂𝜎2 − 1)𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)2  
The expected quality of the crops: 𝔼[𝑞𝑖] =   𝔼 [𝑎𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝛼𝜉𝑗 ] =  (1+𝛼2)𝑐(1+𝛼2+𝑐𝜂1𝜎2(1−𝛼2)2)   
Expected total value of payments:  𝔼[𝑤𝑖] =  𝔼[𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑞𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑞𝑗] = zi + 𝑣𝑖 (𝑣𝑖𝑐 ) + ℎ𝑖 (𝑣𝑗𝑐 ) = (1 + 𝛼2)2𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2)   
Expected utility of the government: 𝔼(𝑞1 − 𝑤1 + 𝑞2 − 𝑤2) =   (1 + 𝛼2)𝑐(1 + 𝛼2 + 𝑐𝜂𝑖𝜎2(1 − 𝛼2)2) 
Expected utility of the producers: 𝔼[−𝑒−𝜂𝑖[𝑤𝑖 −𝜙𝑖(𝑎𝑖)]] =  𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑗 − 12 𝑐𝑎𝑖2 − 12 𝜂𝑖𝜎2[(𝑣𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝛼)2 + (ℎ𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝛼)2] = 0 
 
DISCUSSION: IMPORTANCE OF 𝜹 
Relative change in biosecurity efforts: 
𝑎𝑖−𝑎𝑖∗𝑎𝑖∗ = 𝛿 
Relative change in own marginal payments:  
𝑣𝑖−𝑣𝑖∗𝑣𝑖∗ = − 𝜎2𝜂𝛿𝑐(𝛼2−1)2𝛼2+1  
Relative change in neighbor marginal payments:  
ℎ𝑖−ℎ𝑖∗ℎ𝑖∗ = 𝛿 
Relative change in expected fixed payments:  
𝔼[𝑧𝑖]−𝔼[𝑧𝑖∗]𝔼[𝑧𝑖∗] = 𝛿2 + 2𝛿  
Relative change in expected total payments received by the producers:  
𝔼[𝑤𝑖]−𝔼[𝑤𝑖∗]𝔼[𝑤𝑖∗] = −𝛿2  
Relative change in expected crop quality levels:  
𝔼[𝑞𝑖]−𝔼[𝑞𝑖∗]𝔼[𝑞𝑖∗] = 𝛿 
Relative change of Government Utility:  
𝔼[𝑼]−𝔼[𝑼∗]𝔼[𝑼∗] = 𝛿2 + 2𝛿 
 
